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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
HOWARD B. CAHOON, 
v. 
ROBERT P. PELTON, 
Respondent. 
Appellant. 
Case No. 
8976 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case was brought in two causes of action. The 
first is for alienation of affections and the second for crim-
inal conversation. The case was tried twice. At the first 
trial, the jury returned a verdict of no cause of action on 
the first cause of action and $20,000 compensatory and 
$5,000 punitive damages on the second cause of action. The 
defendant moved for a new trial on the second cause of 
action and the trial court in a Memorandum Decision found 
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that the verdict on the second cause of action was excessive 
in the amount of $15,000 general damages and $4,000 puni-
tive damages and ordered that plaintiff remit the said 
$19,000 or submit to a new trial on the second cause of 
action. The plaintiff elected to submit to a new trial. De-
fendant objected to a new trial on the first cause of action 
for the reason that the plaintiff had not moved for a new 
trial on that cause of action and did so for the first time 
in a motion dated the 5th day of September, 1958, whereas 
the Court had signed a Memorandum Decision on the 20th 
day of May, 1958 granting a new trial on the second cause 
of action only and judgment was made and entered on the 
17th day of April, 1958. Plaintiff's counsel attempted to 
avoid the necessity of making a motion for a new trial on 
the April judgment by causing a new judgment, obtained 
ex parte, to be entered dated the 5th day of September, 1958. 
After hearing these motions, the Honorable Stewart M. 
Hanson, before whom the first trial was held, ordered a 
new trial on both causes of action. 
The case was tried for the second time before the Hon-
orable A. H. Ellett. At the conclusion of the evidence, the 
Court submitted a series of special verdicts to the jury. 
In response to these special verdicts, the jurors found that 
the defendant alienated the affections of the plaintiff's 
"wife" and had criminal conversation with her. They 
assessed $2,500 general damages on the first cause of action 
for alienation of affections and assessed $25,000 general 
damages plus $12,000 punitive damages for the criminal 
conversation. They also made a special finding that the 
plaintiff would have spent $17,000 supporting his "wife" 
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if his "wife" had never known Pelton. The question then 
naturally arose as to what all these special findings meant. 
Plaintiff claimed that his total verdict should have been 
$2,500 plus $25,000 plus $12,000 or a total of $39,500. The 
defendant claimed that the jurors intended that the $17,-
000 should be deducted from the $39,500, leaving a verdict 
of $22,500. The Court entered judgment for $26,000, his 
theory as indicated by this Memorandum Decision being 
that the jury intended the $17,000 as an offset, but that 
their intention could not be given full effect because an 
offset was only proper against the alienation of affections 
action and not against the action for criminal conversation. 
The Court further found that the punitive damages were 
excessive by $11,000. The trial court denied motions made 
and argued by defendant for a judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict and for a new trial. 
From these two judgments and from the rulings of 
the Court, defendant takes this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The evidence introduced at both trials is substantially 
the same. Therefore, the facts will be considered as though 
the evidence was introduced in one case. 
The plaintiff was at the time of the trials unmarried, 
having been divorced by his former wife, Dorothy Cahoon, 
also known as Dorothy Williams, and Dorothy Shaw, here-
inafter referred to as Mrs. Shaw, in Nevada on December 
4, 1956, in an action in which she, as plaintiff, alleged, 
proved and was adjudged to have sustained extreme mental 
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cruelty (R. 453-494). Plaintiff's said wife married Gerald 
F. Shaw, a Las Vegas taxi operator, in Dec~mber, 1957 
after a seven-month acquaintance and presently resides 
with Shaw in the Cahoon family home in Las Vegas, 
Nevada (R. 625). 
The plaintiff at the time of the second trial was 43 
years of age. He first met Mrs. Shaw when she was work-
ing at the Hotel Utah as a waitress (R. 416). He went 
with her about a year and a half and "married" her on 
June 28, 1947 [The record incorrectly states 1957] (R. 416). 
At the time of their "marriage" Dorothy had two children 
by a prior marriage, Roxanne, then age 7, and Sylvia, then 
age 5 (R. 416-417). It also appears that at the time the 
plaintiff "married" Mrs. Shaw, she had not obtained a 
final decree of divorce. Exhibit D-2 shows that she ob-
tained a final decree of divorce in California from Mark 
H. vVilliams on the 7th day of June, 1948, almost one year 
after her "marriage" to plaintiff. The affidavit for a 
final decree shows that an interlocutory decree was entered 
as of the 13th day of March, 1946 (Exhibit D-2). Exhibit 
D-2 shows that the final decree was entered nunc pro tunc 
as of June 23, 1948. The only marriage performed between 
plaintiff and his "wife" was the marriage performed on 
the 28th day of June, 1948, almost a year prior to the time 
application was made for a final decree (R. 480). 
Plaintiff and Mrs. Shaw lived the first two years of 
their "marriage" in Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 447). During 
this time they had one child. While in Salt Lake City, they 
worked together in the Jiffy Dog Business. They started 
this business in their home and later opened an office on 
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State Street (R. 460). According to the plaintiff this 
was a period of happiness. They "went on a number of trips 
* * * both were active in the Variety Club in Salt Lake 
City" and his "wife" "seemed to love me and enjoy my 
company, and we both had a lot of fun together" (R. 459). 
Mrs. Shaw, however, testified to a different feeling which 
existed during this period. She stated that from the very 
beginning there was no affection in their "marriage." She 
remembered on numerous occasions on 19th East when 
"we moved into our home up there, I remember many 
nights that he's, I mean, being a newlywed, I expected, you 
know, the usual love and it just wasn't there. I would get 
out of bed and slam the door and go out in the front room 
and sleep. I mean, he was very cold and indifferent to me" 
(R. 628) . She further testified that during this period and 
while on a trip to Montana, her husband had struck her 
in the nose causing it to bleed. While they were in Salt 
Lake City nothing at all interfered with their "marriage" 
other than their own conduct (R. 481). After living two 
years in Salt Lake City they moved to Las Vegas where 
plaintiff operated two drive-in theatres. While there, plain-
tiff and Mrs. Shaw met defendant at a Kiwanian conven-
tion. This was in November of 1954 (R. 418). 
At all times material to the case the plaintiff and Mrs. 
Shaw were domiciled and actually lived in the State of 
Nevada. 
In the summer and early fall of 1955, Mrs. Shaw spent 
two or three weeks on a vacation in Salt Lake City (R. 
473). Early in 1956, plaintiff for the first time observed 
a change in her attitude toward him (R. 4 73) . She seemed 
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pleased when he left town and when they were ready to 
leave on a planned trip to New Orleans she urged him to jt 
go alone which resulted in the trip being cancelled (R. 474). !1 
During this period of growing indifference, he saw Pelton 
in the bar at the Riviera Hotel in Las Vegas. He observed 
that Pelton "ducked his head down and turned away from 
me." At that time plaintiff testified he had not suspected 
that anything was wrong (R. 475). 
Mrs. Shaw testified, as herein indicated, that from the 
beginning there was little, if any, affection existing be-
tween herself and her husband. When asked specifically 
whether or not defendant had alienated her affections from 
her husband, she testified "I can't see how it would be 
possible * * * there certainly weren't any wifely af-
fections or husband so I don't see-I have never been able 
to understand how affections can be alienated if there are 
no affections" (R. 627). 
She explained some of the incidents which alienated 
whatever affection she had for her husband. The first diffi-
culty arose at the very beginning of their "married" life 
and it was because of plaintiff's lack of sexual interest in 
her (R. 628). This indifference persisted throughout their 
"married" life, so much so that she suggested that he see 
a doctor which he finally did. The doctor apparently sug-
gested some pills which he did take "for a week. Then he 
perished the thought. And that would be the end of it" (R. 
631). 
She testified "during our whole married life, there 
were times that there was no intercourse, sometimes from 
-as long as six to nine months" (R. 631). 
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When Mrs. Shaw's sister, Virginia, related to her an 
incident which occurred when the plaintiff made a "pass" 
at her while drunk in a tourist cabin in California she was 
only a little amazed. She testified "I was a little amazed." 
"I would say that Howard is naturally a cold, frigid man 
and that no woman would interest him" (R. 641). 
This lack of sexual interest and affection caused Mrs. 
Shaw to consult a lawyer in 1955. This lawyer was a mutual 
friend. He called the plaintiff to his office and talked to 
the plaintiff about the lack of affection which plaintiff had 
for Mrs. Shaw (R. 237). This all occurred before Pelton 
had any association with Mrs. Shaw. 
Mrs. Shaw also testified to other incidents which caused 
her to lose whatever affection she had for her husband. 
She spoke of these to Mrs. Thiriot, the wife of her hus-
band's friend, and complained to her that her husband had 
been very rude in her presence. She said "I mean, he was 
rude, as much as his belching and making those strange 
noises and then laughing like a child * * *" This was 
prior to the time that she met Mr. Pelton. 
Her husband's conduct in staying out all night or until 
late unusual hours of the morning playing panguini also 
was a source of annoyance to Mrs. Shaw. She said "Well, 
for a length, quite a long length of time, he got a streak; 
and he would on numerous occasions stay out and play pan-
guini all night and then he would come home and sleep most 
of the day" (R. 633) . 
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The most serious difficulty which arose between plain-
tiff and his "wife" commenced long prior to the time she 
met the defendant. It was an incident which concerned their 
last child. On this occasion, while Mrs. Shaw was pregnant, 
she testified that her husband accused her of being preg-
nant with a child not his. Her exact words in this respect 
were as follows : "Well, there was an occasion when I be-
came pregnant with Brit, who is four years old now, and 
at the time I found it out, from the Doctor, Howard was in 
Los Angeles and when he came home, I told him. And he 
said, 'Well.' He said 'that isn't my baby.' And I said 'Well, 
if it isn't yours, I don't know whose it is.' And he said 
'Well,' -he didn't say anything for a couple of days. Then 
he said, 'Well, if this isn't my baby,' he says 'I want you to 
have an abortion'" (R. 629). 
The defendant admitted that a conversation of this 
nature had occurred. However, he testified that he desired 
her to have an abortion because of their different blood 
types and not because the child was not his. He admitted, 
however, that he made the accusation to his "wife" that 
the child was not his but that he did it simply because he was 
mad (R. 206). The accusation of paternity occurred prior 
to the time of Pelton. 
The plaintiff, for the most part, did not deny the ac-
cusations made bv Mrs. Shaw against him which she 
claimed had caused her to lose any affection she may have 
had. He thought that his sexual interest in her was normal 
and that there was a deep and abiding affection existing 
between them. 
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The testimony of plaintiff's stepdaughter, Roxanne 
Freeman, was introduced in evidence. This testimony, 
which was undisputed showed that plaintiff and Mrs. Shaw 
were having difficulties before Pelton and that Mrs. Shaw 
was out with other men. This evidence is as follows : 
"Q. Do you know of any other man or men 
that your mother went out with prior to the time 
that your mother and father were divorced other 
than the defendant, Pelton? 
"A. Never, their names. There are times she 
did go out dancing with a girl that used to live with 
us, that used to take care of us. 
"Q. With men? 
"A. They would go out on Boulder Highway or 
over to the Saddle Club to dance" (R. 529, 530). 
* * * * 
"Q. How many such occasions were there when 
your mother and Mrs. Dunklin were out dancing 
with other men? 
"A. Oh usually, maybe, when mother would 
get off work out at the theatre or may be on Satur-
day nights. Usually when Sylvia or one of us was 
there to watch the children. 
"Q. Would you say once or twice a week? 
"A. Maybe once a week. 
"Q. Over a period of months? 
"A. Yes, uh huh. 
"Q. And it was during the year 1954 and 1955, 
would you say? 
"A. Yes. 
* * * * 
"Q. But you didn't know the names of any of 
the men? 
"A. No. 
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"Q. Did any of the men come to the house? 
"A. No. There was a man that brought her 
home one night from one of the bars or clubs some 
place. 
"Q. What time did he bring her home? 
"A. It was about 6:00 in the morning, about 
5:00 or 6:00 in the morning. Many times Dad would 
be out playing cards" (R. 530-531). 
The testimony of Mrs. Shaw's sister, Virginia Holt, 
is also enlightening: 
"Q. And also prior to the time she met Mr. 
Pelton, did you know something of your sister's at-
titude and her conduct, Mrs. Holt? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And prior to that time do you know of 
your own knowledge if she was going out with other 
men? 
"A. Yes, she was. 
"Q. And how did you know that, Mrs. Holt? 
"A. Well, I have seen her. 
"Q. Other men when she was drinking? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Has your sister talked to you about those 
occasions? 
"A. Yes (R. 662-663). 
"Q. Now, how many occasions, Mrs. Holt, did 
you see your sister out at this time? 
"A. Several. 
"Q. And that was prior to the time of 1956, 
was it not? 
"A. Yes" (R. 663). 
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The evidence concerning Mrs. Shaw and Pelton is 
scanty. The testimony relating to their conduct shows that 
they corresponded together, that they went out together, 
both in Salt Lake and in Nevada, but mostly in Nevada. 
They boated together along with plaintiff's stepdaughter 
and her boy friend and apparently went swimming to-
gether. The defendant came to the home of plaintiff at 
least on one occasion when plaintiff was not present and 
was served a highball and according to the testimony of 
plaintiff's stepdaughter, kissed Mrs. Shaw on that occasion. 
This was denied by the defendant. The defendant and Mrs. 
Shaw were seen on one occasion alone together in a motel 
room (R. 525). 
Plaintiff first learned that his "wife" had been seeing 
the defendant Pelton at a time when plaintiff was in Las 
Vegas, Nevada and plaintiff testified that it was in Las 
Vegas, Nevada that his feelings were wounded, and where 
he observed a change in his "wife's" attitude towards him 
(R. 491-492). 
The only direct evidence of criminal conversation came 
from the testimony of plaintiff's brother, Richard Cahoon. 
He stated that he had a conversation with the defendant 
at the defendant's place of business sometime in December, 
1956 in which the following was stated: "I said, 'Well, 
what about the time Roxanne said that you slept with Dor-
othy there in Howard's home?' And he emphatically denied 
it. He said that the times he slept with Dorothy was either 
in his motel in Las Vegas or in Salt Lake City where the 
children weren't around * * *" (R. 541). This con-
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versation was categorically denied by the defendant (R. 
604). 
It is also significant that Roxanne, the plaintiff's step-
daughter, did not testify to the allegations made in Richard 
Cahoon's question. 
While the plaintiff's brother, Richard Cahoon, made 
several efforts to converse with the defendant, the plain-
tiff himself never, on any occasion, ever spoke to Pelton 
or asked him any questions relative to his alleged conduct 
with Mrs. Shaw but simply filed suit for alienation of 
affections and criminal conversation. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE ALLEGED MARRIAGE B E T WE E N 
PLAINTIFF AND MRS. SHAW PROVIDES NO 
BASIS FOR A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST 
DEFENDANT. 
POINT II. 
AN ACTION FOR CRIMINAL CONVERSATION 
IS NOT PERMITTED UNDER THE UTAH 
LAW. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY ON THE ISSUE OF PUNITIVE DAM-
AGES AND IN PERMITTING EVIDENCE OF 
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WEALTH TO BE INTRODUCED ON THE 
ISSUE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A NEW 
TRIAL ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR AT THE SECOND TRIAL IN GIVING 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 (R. 124-125). 
POINT VI. 
PLAINTIFF IS BARRED FROM BRINGING 
AN ACTION ARISING OUT OF HIS MAR-
RIAGE BY REASON OF A PRIOR DIVORCE 
OBTAINED BY MRS. SHAW BASED ON HIS 
MISCONDUCT. 
POINT VII. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFEN-
DANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 22 
(R. 114) AND IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 
13 (R. 126) AND NO. 15 (R. 128). 
POINT VIII. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THE 
LIFE EXPECTANCY TABLES, INSTRUCTION 
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NO. 7, FIRST TRIAL (R. 21), INSTRUCTION 
NO. 15, SECOND TRIAL (R. 128) AND IN PER-
MITTING COUNSEL TO ARGUE FROM THE 
SAME TO THE JURY. 
POINT IX. 
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ER-
ROR IN THE SECOND TRIAL IN ALLOWING 
AN OFFSET OF $17,000.00 AGAINST ONLY 
THE ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS JUDG-
MENT. 
POINT X. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN PERMITTING COUNSEL FOR THE 
DEFENDANT TO READ TO THE JURORS 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FROM DEPOSI-
TIONS IN WHICH THE WITNESSES CLAIMED 
THEIR PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF INCRIM-
INATION. 
POINT XI. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFEN-
DANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NOS. 
24, 25 AND 26. 
POINT XII. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFEN-
DANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 20. 
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POINT XIII. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 12. 
POINT XIV. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 13. 
POINT XV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL ON THE GROUNDS 
THAT THE VERDICT WAS GROSSLY EX-
CESSIVE AND UNWARRANTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE ALLEGED MARRIAGE B E T W E E N 
PLAINTIFF AND MRS. SHAW PROVIDES NO 
BASIS FOR A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST 
DEFENDANT. 
The Legislature of the State of Utah has provided that 
certain marriages are prohibited and void. Section 30-1-2, 
·utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides as follows: 
"The following marriages are prohibited and 
declared void : 
* * * * 
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"(2) When there is a husband or wife living 
from whom the person marrying has not been di-
vorced. 
* * * * 
" ( 7) Between a divorced person and any per-
son other than the one from whom the divorce was 
secured until the divorce decree becomes absolute, if 
an appeal is taken, until after the affirmance of 
the decree." 
The alleged marriage performed between the plaintiff 
and Mrs. Shaw occurred on June 27, 1947. At that time 
Mrs. Shaw was not finally divorced from her husband, Mark 
H. Williams. 
Exhibit D-2 shows that she obtained a final decree of 
divorce from Mark H. Williams on the 7th day of June, 
1948, almost a year after her marriage to the plaintiff. 
The affidavit for a final decree was not even made until 
after Mrs. Shaw "married" the plaintiff in Salt Lake City. 
The fact that the decree was entered nunc pro tunc as of 
June 23, 1948 five days before the marriage performed be-
tween the Plaintiff and Mrs. Shaw does not render the 
marriage valid. The only marriage performed between the 
plaintiff and Mrs. Shaw was the marriage of June 28, 1948. 
If the marriage of the plaintiff and Mrs. Shaw was 
void and unlawful at its inception, as provided by statutes 
of the State of Utah, it could not subsequently be rendered 
valid. Void marriages are not marriages at all and do 
not even require an annulment proceeding to determine 
their nullity. In Sanders v. Industl·ial Commission, 64 Utah 
372, 230 Pac. 1026, followed in Jenkins v. Jenkh1s, 107 Utah 
239, 153 P. 2d 262 and in Re Dalton's Estate, 109 Utah 503, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
,,.. 
.-.I 
167 P. 2d 690, the Court held that where a woman remarried 
within six months after entry of interlocutory divorce de-
cree the marriage was void ab initio and no rights accrued 
to either party to the marriage by reason thereof. 
In the Jenkins case supra, the Court said: 
"In view of the fact that the plaintiff had only 
an interlocutory decree of divorce from her prior 
marriage and said decree had not yet become final, 
she was still married at the time of her purported 
marriage to defendant and the trial court correctly 
held that the purported marriage was void ab initio." 
The Court further said : 
"The continued cohabitation as man and wife 
after the said interlocutory decree became final 
would not validate the void marriage. See Sanders 
v. Industrial Commission, supra. Since the purported 
marriage was void, there was no grounds nor neces-
sity for divorce. However, it is proper for the good 
of society and the peace of mind of the persons con-
cerned that void marriages be so declared by a de-
cree of the court. Such a declaration could properly 
have been obtained by a suit for an annulment." 
The California courts have likewise held that a mar-
riage performed before a final decree is entered is void. 
The California statute which is applicable is as follows: 
cc 132: 
"Final judgment may be entered one year after 
the entry of the interlocutory judgment on the mo-
tion of either party or on the court's own motion. The 
final judgment restores the parties to the status of 
single persons. The death of either party after the 
entry of the interlocutory judgment does not im-
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pair the power of the court to enter a final judg-
ment. Such entry does not validate any marriage 
contracted by either party before the entry thereof 
nor constitute any defense in any criminal prosecu-
tion against either of them." (Emphasis ours.) 
The California courts had occasion to construe the fore-
going statute in Corbett v. Corbett, 298 Pac. 819, 113 Cal. 
App. 595, decided April 23, 1931 by the District Court of 
Appeals, Third District in California. In that case the 
defendant had obtained an interlocutory decree of divorce 
on June 29, 1926. Before obtaining a final decree and more 
than one year after the interlocutory decree had been 
awarded she married the plaintiff. A final decree was 
entered after the subsequent marriage. Thereafter, a suit 
was brought for annulment of the last marriage. The 
Court in sustaining the trial court's judgment granting the 
annulment said : 
"Until the final judgment of divorce has been 
actually rendered and entered, the spouses are not 
restored to their status of unmarried persons. Until 
this final decree has been actually rendered and en-
tered, the spouses are disqualified from remarrying." 
The California court quoted from Section 132 of the 
Civil Code wherein it is provided as follows: 
"When one year has expired after the entry of 
such interlocutory judgment, the court on motion of 
either party, or upon its own motion, may enter the 
final judgment granting the divorce, and such final 
judgment shall restore them to the status of single 
persons, and permit either to marry after the en-
try thereof." 
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The California court then said : 
"This language clearly prohibits a person from 
remarrying until after the actual rendition and 
entry of his final judgment of divorce." 
Since the Corbett case, the California Legislature has 
enacted into law the following provision (West's Annotated 
California Code Section 133) : 
"Entry of Final Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc: 
Effect of such Entry; Marriage Subsequent to In-
terlocutory Judgment Validated. Whenever either 
of the parties in a divorce action is, under the law, 
entitled to a final judgment, but by mistake, negli-
gence or inadvertence the same has not been signed, 
filed and entered, if no appeal has been taken from 
the interlocutory judgment or motion made for a 
new trial, the court, on the motion of either party 
thereto or upon its own motion, may cause a final 
judgment to be signed, dated, filed and entered 
therein granting the divorce as of the date when 
the same could have been given or made by the 
court if applied for. The court may cause such final 
judgment to be signed, dated, filed and entered nunc 
pro tunc as aforesaid, even though a final judg-
ment may have been previously entered whereby 
mistake, negligence or inadvertence the same has 
not been signed, filed or entered as soon as it could 
have been entered under the law if applied for. Upon 
the filing of such final judgment, the parties to 
such action shall be deemed to have been restored to 
the status of single persons as of the date affixed 
to such judgment, and any marriage of either of 
such parties subsequent to one year after the grant-
ing of the interlocutory judgment as shown by the 
minutes of the court, and after the final judgment 
could have been entered under the law if applied for, 
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shall be valid for all purposes as of the date affixed 
to such final judgment upon the filing thereof." 
It thus appears clear that the California Legislature 
has provided that a void marriage performed during the 
interlocutory period can be rendered valid by entering a 
retroactive nunc pro tunc order after the marriage has 
been performed. This, of course, would be binding on the 
California courts in construing marriages performed in 
the State of California. Whether or not it is binding in 
Utah is the question before this Court. 
In determining whether or not the marriage in Utah 
is valid, we must look to the law of the state where the 
marriage was performed. This rule is stated in Restate-
ment Conflict of Laws, Section 121. In Huard v. McTeigh, 
113 Ore. 279, 232 Pac. 658, 39 A. L. R. 528, the Oregon 
court construed as void a marriage which was performed 
in Victoria, British Columbia during an interlocutory per-
iod from a divorce granted in the State of Washington. At 
the time the marriage was performed in Victoria, the two 
parties were residents of Washington. The Washington 
statutes provided: 
"And it shall be unlawful for any divorced per-
son to intermarry with any third person within six 
months from the date of the entry of the judgment 
or decree granting the divorce, or in case an appeal 
is taken, it shall be unlawful to contract such mar-
riage until judgment be rendered on said appeal in 
the Supreme Court." 
The Washington statutes further provided: 
"All marriages contracted in violation of the 
provision of this section whether contracted within 
or without this state shall be void." 
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The Oregon court in determining the British Columbia 
marriage invalid said : 
"Until the expiration of the statutory period 
against remarriage had expired, the defendant did 
not ha.ve capacity to enter into a contract of mar-
riage. In contemplation of law her social status was 
the same as if no decree had been made. At the 
time of her alleged marriage at Victoria, she had a 
husband living. This marriage at the time of its 
inception was therefore polygamous in character. 
When persons enter into a contract of marriage, 
either pursuant to statute or common law, it is essen-
tial to the validity of the same that they have ca-
pacity and are competent so to contract. (Empha-
sis added.) 
* * * * 
"The general rule, for which we take it no au-
thorities need be cited, is that a marriage valid 
where solemnized is valid every where. The con-
verse of this rule, however, is more applicable to 
the case at bar. A marriage invalid where solem-
nized is invalid everywhere. Hutchins v. Kimmel, 
31 Mich. 126, 18 Am. Rep. 164. People v. Shaw, 259 
Ill. 544, L. R. A., 1915 East 87, 102 N. E. 1031. The 
legality of a marriage must be determined by the 
laws of the state in which the marriage is consum-
mated. 
* * * 
"The marriage was invalid in its inception and 
ever remains so while the parties reside in the State 
of Washington." (Emphasis added.) 
At the time the marriage was performed in Utah, the 
California law provided and still so provides that until a 
final decree is entered neither party having an interlocutory 
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decree of divorce can perform a valid marriage either in 
California or elsewhere. The Utah law also so provides. 
The conclusion is, therefore, inescapable that at the time 
the marriage between plaintiff and "Dorothy Williams" 
was performed in Utah, "Dorothy Williams" did not have 
the capacity to contract a valid marriage in the State of 
Utah. The marriage at that moment was not voidable. It 
was void. In some states a nunc pro tunc entry of an order 
made by a court based on a prior judicial act renders the 
prior marriage valid. This is in accordance with the com-
mon law rule that formal entry of a judicial act previo11.$ly 
made, may be made nunc pro tunc. However, a nunc pro 
tunc ent~y of an order previously made is entirely differ-
ent from the nunc pro tunc rendition of a judgment which 
is to take retroactive effect. We are aware of no Utah 
decision which permits a nunc pro tunc effect to be given 
to the making of an order. 
The California legislation goes far beyond the tradi-
tional judicial nunc pro tunc order and provides that even 
where no judicial act has been performed and no final de-
cree granted or entered, the court upon a showing of negli-
gence on the part of either party to the interlocutory decree 
of divorce may back date the final order from the date 
when it was actually entered to a prior date when it could 
have been entered had the parties applied to the court and 
made a proper showing. This, of course, means that Cali-
fornia is making a retroactive law, which if given effect 
in another state would have retroactive effect on acts 
which were void at their inception. This, we believe, is not 
only on its face unsound but is against good public policy 
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and in any event is against the stated public policy of the 
State of Utah. This policy is stated by Justice Wolfe in 
a special concurring opinion in the case of In Re Vitas' 
Estate, 110 Utah 187, 170 P. 2d 183, as follows: 
"Logically all marriages proscribed by Section 
40-1-2 whether with one having a disability or be-
cause not solemnized when made by our domiciliar-
ies outside of this state would be against our an-
nounced public policy and our courts should there-
fore not recognize them." 
Even if the Utah court had not announced the public 
policy of the state in this regard, sound reason would re-
quire that a marriage performed under the circumstances 
in this case should not be considered valid as against the 
defendant. If the position taken by the plaintiff in this 
case is correct, "Mrs. Williams" at the time she entered into 
the ceremony with the plaintiff had it within her power 
at any time in the future to treat the marriage performed 
between herself and the plaintiff as either void, as pro-
vided by the Utah statute, or valid as provided by the Cali-
fornia Legislature at her election. She could have lived 
with the plaintiff in the State of Utah for as many years 
as she so desired with an option on her part to make the 
marrage valid by her ex· parte conduct in California, or to 
treat is as void as provided by the Utah statute by not ob-
taining a nunc pro tunc order in California. Certainly con-
tracts, and particularly marriage contracts, cannot be so 
loosely construed. 
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Other Utah statutes bearing upon this point are as 
follows: 
"30-3-8-Remarriage-when unlawful: 
"It shall be unlawful for either party to a di-
vorce proceeding whose marriage is dissolved by 
the decree to marry any person other than the hus-
band or wife from whom the divorce was granted 
until it becomes absolute, and if an appeal is taken 
until after affirmance of the decree." 
The situation would be quite different if the invalida-
tion of this marriage would affect the legitimacy of the 
children by this marriage. 77-60-14, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 eliminates that problem. The situation would also be 
different if either plaintiff or Mrs. Shaw were questioning 
the validity of the marriage. In either case, other princi-
ples of law would be invoked. 
POINT II. 
AN ACTION FOR CRIMINAL CONVERSATION 
IS NOT PERMITTED UNDER THE UTAH 
LAW. 
We have no statutory law which authorizes a suit for 
criminal conversation nor do we have any judicial author-
ity in this jurisdiction by decision or otherwise which au-
thorizes such an action. If the right to such an action 
exists, it exists by virtue of the common law. The common 
law in Utah was adopted in 1898 by what is known as 
Chapter 3, 68-3-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. It is as fol-
lows: 
"The common law of England so far as it is 
not repugnant to or in conflict with, the constitu-
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tion or laws of the United States, or the constitution 
or laws of this state, and so far only as it is consist-
ent with and adapted to the natural and physical 
conditions of this state and the necessities of the 
people thereof, is hereby adopted, and shall be the 
rule of decision in all courts of this state." 
The question then becomes: What was the common 
law of England with reference to actions for criminal con-
versation? Prior to 1857, the right to an action for crim-
inal conversation existed under the common law of England. 
As will be shown, under Point 3 infra, this cause of action 
was quite different from the cause of action as conceived 
by both trial courts in the instant case. Whatever may 
have been the nature of the cause of action at common law 
in England, it was repealed by the Matrimonial Causes 
Act of 1857. Under this Act, a new cause of action was 
substituted for the old, which new cause of action provided 
that a claim for damages could be made by a husband 
against one who had engaged in intercourse with his wife 
in an action wherein the husband sought divorce against 
his wife by reason of this infidelity. In Butterworth v. But-
terworth, 10 British Ruling Cases, Page 352, decided in 
1920, there is a very interesting discussion on this point. 
The question before the court in that case concerned the 
measure of damages to be applied in a case arising under 
the Matrimonial Causes Act. The court said : 
"The powers of the divorce court to award dam-
ages for adultery rests in Section 33 of the Matri-
monial Causes Act, 1857, which Act abolished the 
old action of criminal conversation." 
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The court in commenting on the old repealed cause of 
action observed : 
"The risk of damages might well have been 
deemed a check to the wanton inclinations of an 
intended adulterer. Whether the act has achieved 
its purpose I do not inquire. The matter is one for 
debate elsewhere. It may perhaps be regarded by 
many as a strong determent. It will suffice to say 
that the claim to damages for adultery is purely to 
anglo saxon countries and, as pointed out in the 
Royal Commission on Divorces, 1912, page 126, for-
eigners cannot understand how the English law al-
lows it." 
In Buchanan v. Crites, 106 Utah 428, 150 P. 2d 100, 
the Supreme Court of Utah in discussing the adoption of 
the common law of England said: 
"The common law of England as adopted by the 
various American jurisdictions, in addition to the 
principles developed by court decision included all 
statutes in effect in England at the time of the adop-
tion. By virtue of statute j5 Richard II/ all force-
able entries were made unlawful." (Emphasis 
added.) 
If Utah adopted the common law of England as modi-
fied by the Matrimonial Causes Act, then it must be con-
cluded that no cause of action exists in the State of Utah 
for criminal conversation. If on the other hand it is con-
cluded that the Matrimonial Causes Act did not affect the 
common law right to bring an action for criminal conversa-
tion, then the primary question becomes what was the com-
mon law right to such an action. 
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In Crocker v. Crocker, 98 Fed. 702, decided by the Fed-
eral Circuit Court in a case arising in Massachusetts, the 
Circuit Judge writing in 1899, three years after Utah be-
came a state, discussed the common law right to bring an 
action for criminal conversation. The Court said: 
"It wiil be seen that the common law gives a 
husband three different suits arising out of three 
different classes of circumstances. One is that 'per 
quod consortium amisit,' arising out of a physical 
injury done the wife by trespass. The development 
of the law lead to including in this class cases of 
injury to the wife's person arising from mere negli-
gence. The next class of cases consists of those com-
monly known as actions of 'criminal conversation.' 
The basis of this is trespass vi et armis, on the 
theory that the wife is not a free agent or separate 
person, and that, therefore, her consent is immater-
ial, so that the adulterer is pursued as a mere tres-
passer. The inapplicability of this class of actions 
as a remedy for a wrong complained of by the wife 
is at once apparent when it is rem.embered that it 
lies at common law, in behalf of the husband, even 
though the wife may be the actual seducer." 
The court further said : 
"At common law, as we have already said, the 
husband had an action for a trespass committed on 
the person of the wife, and for the consequences of 
a negligent act through which the wife suffered per-
sonal injury; but, even in those jurisdictions where 
the wife has been given a sole cause of action for 
tort, it has been found necessary to apply to the 
Legislature before a like action could be given her, 
even for the maiming of the husband, through which 
her pecuniary support, to which she had been ac-
customed, might be taken away." 
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It will thus be observed that the common law right to 
bring an action for criminal conversation was a peculiar 
development of the Anglo-Saxon law. It was based on 
coverture of the wife ; of her inability to bring an action 
in her own name; and on a sort of property right which 
the husband had in his wife. The action was actually for 
trespass. Because of this peculiar development it was un-
thinkable at early common law that a wife could bring 
an action for criminal conversation against one who had 
sexual rel~t!o11s :w.:ith. her husband. We submit that this pe-
culiar development of the English common law and the 
peculiar grounds upon which it was based were and are 
repugnant to the laws of the State of Utah and are not 
consistent with and adapted to the necessities of the people 
of this state as indicated in 68-3-1, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953. 
In the State of Utah, a husband has no property right 
in his wife. Women in the State of Utah have been com-
pletely emancipated. In fact, Utah has been a leader in this 
respect. In Utah, a wife has a right to bring actions in her 
own name. If criminal conversation is suitable and con-
sistent with our laws and the necessities of our people, it 
necessarily would be available to both a husband and wife 
alike. The common law of England as it existed in terri-
torial days offered no authority which would permit a wife 
or husband to bring a suit for criminal conversation. 
We are not unmindful of the modern common law 
which is in effect in some states which permits actions for 
criminal conversation on an entirely different basis than 
that conceived by the common law of England and by the 
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early common law as it was followed in most of the early 
decisions in this country. We further note that in some 
jurisdictions the right to bring such an action is based on 
statute, and that in at least four jurisdictions the right has 
been abolished by statute. [See Young v. Young, 184 So. 
187, 236 Ala. 627; Bean v. McFarland, 273 N. W. 332, 280 
Mich. 19; Burton v. Burton, 192 Atl. 727; 15 N. J. (Misc.) 
532; Hanfgarn v. Mark, 10 N. E. 2d 556, 274 N.Y. 570.] 
In any event this is a case of first impression in this 
jurisdiction. The cause of action is in general modern dis-
repute. It had its origin in an antiquated property right 
which a husband had in his wife and depended on the cov-
erture of the wife and the fiction that she could not consent. 
It was considered a trespass vi et armis. Without this 
peculiar development based on fictions and archaic ideas of 
marriage the cause of action would undoubtedly never have 
originated. It would have developed as a part of the action 
for alienation of affections. It has in fact, for all practical 
purposes, been cut back to that status by the Matrimonial 
Causes Act of 1857. We believe that this court should not 
create in this case of first impression, unpopular causes of 
action especially in the face of our statutory adoption of the 
common law of England, which abolished it and the peculiar 
archaic history which created it. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY ON THE ISSUE OF PUNITIVE DAM-
AGES AND IN PERMITTING EVIDENCE OF 
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WEALTH TO BE INTRODUCED ON THE 
ISSUE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
The common law of England, as developed by the 
English courts, did not permit punitive damages in a case 
of criminal conversation. This is clearly indicated in But-
terworth v. Butterworth, supra wherein the issue concerned 
the type of damages allowable to a husband against his 
wife's paramour in an action arising under the Matrimonial 
Causes Act. The court said: 
"Excluding then the cases which fall within 
Bernstein v. Bernstein, supra, and excluding also this 
specific provision of Section 33 as to the allocation of 
a warded damages, it is clear that the claim to dam-
ages is to be tried as if in an action for criminal 
conversation." 
The court then quoted from Darbishire v. Darbishire, 
1890, 62 L. T. N. S. 664 wherein Lord Hansen said: 
"A basic question is whether the damages are 
compensatory only, or whether they may be what 
the law calls exemplary or punitive damages." 
The court in answering this query said : 
"That the damages are at large is clear. This 
appears from all the decisions and text books * * * 
Apparently the action for criminal conversation be-
came conspicuously sui generis and grew to be sub-
ject to particular rules as to damages, distinguish-
ing it from other tort. In none of the textbooks 
later than Blackstone, it is stated that the damages 
may be exemplary or punitive * * * · I can find 
no case in which the Judge told the jury that they 
might get exemplary or punitive damages in a case 
for criminal conversation." 
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The court, in Butterworth v. Butterworth, supra, then 
went on to say : 
"I must therefore take it now to be the settled 
rule of this court, in spite of heavy verdicts given 
by certain juries that compensatory damages can 
only be given and that exemplary or punitive dam-
ages are not permissible. That it is not the func-
tion of the court to punish adultery as such, or to 
penalize mere sexual immorality as such, seems to 
be cogent as shown by the apparent settled rule [to 
which I hereafter refer], that costs are not given 
against a correspondent who was unaware at the 
time of his adultery that the woman was married." 
If the common law of England clearly did not allow 
exemplary or punitive damages for criminal conversation, 
how did the law become established in some of the early 
decisions in this country? 
One of the early decisions is the case of Cornelius v. 
Hambay, 150 Pa. 359, 24 Atl. 515, wherein the Pennsyl-
vania court held that plaintiff was entitled to punitive dam-
ages in cases of this kind. The court in justifying its posi-
tion said: 
"This belongs to a class of cases in which the 
plaintiff has been allowed from time immemorial 
to recover punitive damages. Hence, we cannot sus-
tain the fifth specification, in which it is alleged 
that the learned Judge erred in applying this prin-
ciple. In view of the fact that it is the settled rule 
in the state, and so understood by nearly every prac-
titioner, we do not care to enter into a discussion 
of the controversy upon this subject which has 
recently arisen between some of our text writers. 
Those who are curious in regard to it are referred 
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to the second volume of Greenleaf on Evidence, 
* * * " 
This casual reference by the court to Greenleaf on 
Evidence, is especially interesting because Greenleaf on 
Evidence does not agree with the court's conclusion. In 
Volume 2, Greenleaf on Evidence, 16th Edition, Page 45, 
Section 55, the following is stated relative to the question 
of whether punitive damages are allowed in actions of this 
kind: 
"But it seems that evidence of the defendant's 
property cannot be given in chief, in order to ac-
quire damages, the true question being, not how 
much money the defendant is able to pay, but how 
much damage the plaintiff has sustained." 
As stated in Butterworth v. Butterworth, supra, "In 
none of the textbooks later than Blackstone it is stated that 
damages may be exemplary or punitive." 
It is suggested by counsel that the idea of punitive 
damages in this country arose not from authority in the 
English common law but from a statement by Blackstone 
which was misconstrued by the early lawyers in this coun-
try and by the early decisions. 
Blackstone's statement is quoted in Bean v. McFarland, 
supTa, as follows : 
"Blackstone in the commentary states 'adultery, 
or criminal conversation with a man's wife, though 
it is, as a public crime, left by our law to the coer-
cion of the spiritual courts; yet considered as a 
civil injury * * * the law gives a satisfaction 
to the husband for it by an action of trespass vi et 
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armis against the adulterer wherein the damages 
recovered are usually very large and exemplary.'" 
We submit that the foregoing gratuitous remarks of 
Mr. Blackstone, even assuming they should be. given the 
force of law, do not "hold" that a jury should be instructed 
on the issue of punitive damages. We suggest that the 
comments of Blackstone form the basic authority for the 
proposition that punitive damages should be allowed and 
that as indicated in Butterworth v. Butterworth, supra, 
there are no English cases "in which the Judge told the 
jury that they might get exemplary or punitive damages 
in a case for criminal conversation." Nor do we see any 
good reason why punitive damages should be allowed, par-
ticularly if there has not been alienation of affections. The 
law provides a punitive remedy for adultery under the penal 
code. Instructing the jury on punitive damages in both alie-
nation of affections and criminal conversation permits the 
jury to punish twice for the same misconduct. 
There is yet another compelling reason why punitive 
damages should not be allowed. Generally, the wife is quite 
as guilty as the defendant. It is not uncommon that she is 
the actual seducer. She is at least in pari delicto with the 
defendant. If the purpose is to punish what happens to 
the wife? In cases of reconciliation, also not uncommon, 
she actually may become the beneficiary of her own wrong 
by sharing in the punitive damages assessed against the 
one she may have seduced. While the penal code may not be 
adapted to the punishing of those who alienate affections, 
the same is not true for those who commit adultery. 
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POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A NEW 
TRIAL ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION. 
A. The Plaintiff Did Not Make a Timely Motion for 
a New Trial. 
At the first trial the jury returned a verdict on April 
17, 1958 of no cause of action for alienation of affections, 
and returned a verdict on the second cause of action for 
$25,000.00 for criminal conversation. A judgment was en-
tered on the verdict on April 7, 1958 which embodied the 
language of the verdict providing no cause of action and 
the language indicating a verdict of $25,000.00 on the 
second cause of action. The formal words of the judgment 
were "WHEREFORE, * * * IT IS ADJUDGED and 
DECREED that said plaintiff have and recover from de-
fendant the sum of $25,000.00." Within the ten days pro-
vided by the new rule, defendant made a motion for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial on 
the second cause of action only. The court in a Memoranda 
Decision dated the 20th day of May, 1958 found that the 
verdict was excessive and ordered a remittitor or a new 
trial (R. 74, 75). 
On the 5th day of September, 1958 the plaintiff ex 
parte caused a new judgment on the verdict to be entered 
reciting a judgment of no cause of action for alienation of 
affections and on that day filed a motion for a new trial 
on both the first and second cause of action. The court in 
an order dated the 3rd day of June, 1958 granted the motion 
for a new trial. 
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It will be noted that the motion for a new trial on the 
first cause of action was filed over six weeks after the 
judgment was entered on the 17th day of June. Plaintiff 
attempted to escape the consequences of this late filing by 
causing a new judgment to be entered on the 5th day of 
September on the pretext that the judgment of April 17, 
1958 did not clearly show a no cause of action on the first 
cause of action. It will be further noted that this new 
judgment was filed without notice even though notice is 
required under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
60 (a). 
Whether notice was required or not the so called new 
judgment did not alter plaintiff's status. The judgment 
of April 17, 1958 needed no amendment. It recited every-
thing anyone need know to ascertain what had occurred 
(R. 70). Nor did plaintiff make any objection to it until 
September 5, 1958 when he without notice caused a new 
judgment to be entered which in no material way changed 
the original. 
The rule is stated in 49 C. J. S., Page 180, Section 62, 
as follows: 
"Generally the sufficiency of a judgment rests 
in its substance rather in its form, and, although an 
informal judgment may be opened to criticism, strict 
formality ordinarily is not essential to the validity 
of a judgment, and, if the record entry is suffi-
cient in substance, mere irregularity or want of tech-
nical form will not render it invalid. Even where the 
form of a judgment is prescribed by statute, a de-
parture from it is not necessarily fatal to the adjudi-
cation, a substantial compliance with statutory pro-
visions with respect to form being sufficient." 
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As a practical rna tter the purpose of a judgment is 
to clearly inform so that execution may be made thereon. 
To say that the judgment of April 17, 1958 was not suffi-
ciently informative would be to strain the technical be-
yond all sense of reality. 
B. There Is No Evidence That the Wife's Affections 
Were Alienated Outside the State of Nevada. 
No competent evidence was received upon which the ' 
jury could find that defendant alienated Mrs. Shaw's affec-
tions in the State of Utah. 
It must be conceded at the outset that any alienation 
of affections in the State of Nevada is not actionable in the 
State of Utah. The court correctly instructed the jury in 
this respect at the first trial in Instruction No. 5 wherein 
the court said that an act resulting in alienation of affec-
tions must have "occurred within the State of Utah and not 
in the State of Nevada." 
The record conclusively shows that if any alienation 
took place it was in Nevada. It was after plaintiff and his 
"wife" had moved from Salt Lake City that they first met 
the defendant (R. 418). The last time Mrs. Shaw was in 
Salt Lake City was in the summer of 1955 when she spent 
a three-week vacation with her family (R. 473). It was 
not until early 1956 that plaintiff first observed the change 
in her attitude toward him (R. 473). This was at a time 
that both plaintiff and Mrs. Shaw lived ccntinuously in 
Las Vegas and at a time when defendant saw her there on ( 
several occasions (R. 475). A finding by the jury that the 
alienation took place in Utah would have no basis in the 
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evidence. The only possibility in this respect consisted of 
letter writing by defendant from Utah to Mrs. Shaw in 
Nevada. 
It is submitted that if this caused the alienation of 
affections, the alienation necessarily took place in Nevada 
where the letters were received and not in Utah where the 
letters were mailed. We believe this conclusion is funda-
mental. 
It is the law of the place where the alleged tort has 
been committed by which liability is to be determined. 
Buhler v. Maddison, 105 Utah 39, 176 P. 2d 118 
State v. Devot, 66 Utah 319, 242 Pac. 395 
Orr v. Sasseman, 239 F. Supp. 548 
Wawrzen v. Rosenberg, 12 F. Supp. 548 
The place of the wrong is the place where the last event 
necessary to give rise to liability occurs. On· v. Sassman, 
supra. Restatement Conflict of Laws, Sec. 377. In this 
case, the last even unquestionably occurred in the State 
of Nevada. 
Under the circumstances of this case, the law of Ne-
vada clearly governs. liability. A case closely in point is 
Gordon v. Parker, 83 F. Supp. 40. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR AT THE SECOND TRIAL IN GIVING 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 (R. 124-125). 
Instruction No. 11 is the sort of instruction that would 
clearly influence a jury in its deliberations. In it the court 
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categorically states what must be found. After clearly 
stating that the "plaintiff" cannot recover on his charge 
of alienation of affections provided affections were lost 
in Nevada, the court then inconsistently said in subpara-
graph (e) of Instruction 11 that he can recover if "Robert 
P. Pelton was not in Nevada at the time he caused her to 
lose her affections for Howard B. Cahoon." 
The difficulty with this instruction is that the question 
is not where Pelton was, but where was Mrs. Shaw at the 
time the alienation of affections took place. The serious-
ness of this error becomes more apparent upon looking at 
the evidence of this case. During 1956 when plaintiff ob-
served for the first time a change in his "wife's" attitude 
toward him, his "wife" was residing almost continuously 
in Las Vegas (R. 473). Her contacts with Pelton consisted 
almost exclusively of visits made by him to Las Vegas and 
by telephone calls and letters which came from outside the 
State of Nevada. These letters were written two or three 
times a month (R. 588). There were five or six telephone 
calls in 1956 (R. 588). If the jury found that these letters 
or phone calls made by Pelton while he "was not in Nevada" 
caused plaintiff's "wife" to lose her affections for her 
husband, then Instruction No. 11, and particularly sub-
paragraph (e) thereof, directs the jury to find in favor 
of the plaintiff even though the affections were alienated 
in Nevada. Notwithstanding the fact that the affections 
were lost in Nevada, the jury could and probably did find 
that defendant was liable because he was not in Nevada, 
at the time the affections were lost. 
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POINT VI. 
PLAINTIFF IS BARRED FROM BRINGING 
AN ACTION ARISING OUT OF HIS MAR-
RIAGE BY REASON OF A PRIOR DIVORCE 
OBTAINED BY MRS. SHAW BASED ON HIS 
MISCONDUCT. 
On December 4, 1956, Mrs. Shaw obtained a divorce 
from plaintiff on the grounds of extreme mental cruelty 
(R. 699). She was awarded custody of the minor children 
of the parties. Defendant filed no counterclaim or cross 
complaint and made no allegation or claim that the divorce 
was in any way caused by defendant's. misconduct. Almost 
a year after this divorce was obtained, to wit, on the 7th 
day of October, 1957, plaintiff filed his action against the 
defendant for alienation of affections and criminal conver-
sation. 
Several courts, including the courts of England, have 
held that a prior divorce prevents a plaintiff from recov-
ering for rights "acquired by marriage." See Iowa cases 
cited infra, and Bergman v. Solomon, 143 Ky. 581; 136 S. 
W. 1010, Pollard v. Ward, 289 Mo. 275; 233 S. W. 14, 
Berney v. Adriance, 157 App. Div. 628, 142 N. Y. S. 748, 
Fry v. Derstler (Pa.) 2 Yeates. 278, Weedon v. Trimbrell, 
5 T. R. 357, 110 Eng. Reprint 199. 
It was so held in Gleason v. Knapp, 56 Mich. 291, 22 
N. W. 865, as follows: 
"If plaintiff had such a cause of action as he 
now asserts, it would not only have been admissible 
in evidence in that divorce suit, but it would have 
been an absolute and perfect defense to it. The 
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suggestion of the Circuit Judge that the jury might, 
if they saw fit, infer that that very divorce suit was 
the outcome of defendant's misconduct, cannot be 
allowed any force, since defendant's failure to de-
fend on that ground, when that defense was open 
to him, and, according to his claim now, was known 
to him, left it as completely cut off as any other; 
and the decree is legally conclusive against him, 
that no such facts exist." 
It was also so held in Duff v. Henderson (1921), 191 
Iowa 819, 183 N. W. 475, which overruled Wood v. Mathews, 
47 Iowa 409, and held in conformity with Hamilton v. Mc-
Neil, 150 Iowa 470; 129 N. W. 480. The court in Duff v. 
Henderson, supra, said: 
"The court now holds that the appellant cannot 
maintain an actiori against the appellee for either 
alienation of the wife's affections or for criminal 
conversation, and the fact that appellant's wife ob-
tained a divorce from him subsequent to the acts 
complained of is a complete bar to the right of the 
appellant to maintain either of said causes of action." 
The Utah Supreme Court had this question before it 
so far as alienation of affections is concerned in the case 
of Sadleir v. Knapton, 5 Utah 2d 33, 296 P. 2d 278. The 
majority of this court held contra to the position urged 
here. Two dissenting Justices felt that a prior divorce 
should bar the action. Justice Henriod, in urging the Iowa 
position stated in the Hamilton Case, supra, said: 
"Many Utah statutes were lifted from those of 
Iowa. The parent of 30-3-9, U. C. A., around which 
this case revolves, apparently was taken from Iowa, 
having been enacted in 1852. Iowa's in 1851. The 
statutes are identical. The statute of Missouri is not, 
I 
J 
1 
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but is similar. Under the circumstances we should 
give great weight to the judicial interpretation of 
the Iowa statute by the Iowa courts, which in the 
Hamilton case, placed an opposite interpretation on 
its identical statute than is placed on our statute 
by the main opinion. We should follow the Iowa 
decision for the reason stated above and for reasons 
following. 
"The main opinion arbitrarily excludes the right 
to sue for alienation of a wife's affections from the 
rights 'acquired by marriage,' saying the quoted 
phrase means only rights between the spouses. There 
is absolutely no statutory basis for such a conno-
tation. If a husband did not get the right to sue for 
alienation of his wife's affections frmn the marriage, 
where did he get it? He had no such right during 
courtship, nor does he have such right after divorce. 
He has no such right where his mistress is lured 
away by Justice CROCKETT'S illicit suitor. There 
can be no logical or other escape from the fact that 
where there is no marriage there is no right to sue, 
so that it follows that a husband has to acquire his 
right to sue for alienation of his wife's affections 
specifically, distinctly and directly from the consum-
mation of a marriage. To say otherwise is to ignore 
fact and resort to fiction, putting words in the leg-
islature's mouth that it did not utter. 
"If the legislature, as far back as 1852, or at 
any time thereafter, had intended to say what this 
court now says it said, it simply could have added 
three little words to its enactment, italicized as fol-
lows: 
"'When a divorce is decreed the guilty 
party forfeits all rights again8t the other ac-
quired by marriage.' 
"Who are we to read into the statute those itali-
cized words left out by the legislature?" 
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POINT VII. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFEN-
DANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 22 
(R. 114) AND IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 
13 (R. 126) AND NO. 15 (R. 128). 
Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 22 was as fol-
lows: 
"You are instructed that plaintiff is not entitled 
to recover any damages for loss of services, affec-
tion, consortium, companionship and society occur-
ring, if at all, after December 4, 1956." 
As herein shown plaintiff's "wife" obtained a divorce 
from plaintiff on December 4, 1956. This divorce was ob-
tained on the grounds of plaintiff's misconduct. It had 
nothing to do with the defendant, and to so conclude would 
go beyond the decree and assume that the divorce was not 
decided for the reasons given. Thus, plaintiff, because of 
his own misconduct deprived himself of his "wife's" ser-
vices, affection, consortium and society from December 4, 
1956 and thereafter. Yet, the jury was instructed in In-
struction No. 13 that plaintiff was : 
"Entitled to recover such a sum of money as 
will fairly and reasonably compensate him for any 
loss of the companionship, aid, society and services .J 
of his wife which he has suffered and is reasonably . 
certain to suffer in the future (emphasis ours) as J 
a proximate result of the conduct of the other per-
son." 
In Instruction No. 15, the jury was invited to extend 1 
this damage element, not only into the indefinite future, but 
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for the entire life expectancy of the plaintiff and his wife, 
to wit: 28.43 years and 33.44 years. Instruction No. 15 
further advised the jury that they could com.pensate the 
plaintiff for the loss of such affection if they found that 
"such affection would have continued for the joint lives of 
Howard B. Cahoon and Dorothy W. Cahoon (R. 128). 
In Beach v. Brown, 20 Wash. 266, 43 L. R. A. 114, 72 
Am. St. Rep. 98, 5 Pac. 46, a plaintiff wife brought suit for 
alienation of affections after she had divorced her husband. 
[presumably because of the grievance giving rise to the 
alienation] The court after holding that she might bring 
the action even after the divorce [Note, as pointed out in 
the Iowa decision these cases are distinguishable from those 
wherein the divorce was granted because of the plaintiff's 
misconduct] had been granted prior to the filing of aliena-
tion of affections said : 
"Of course, the damages could not be calculated 
after the time when the decree of divorce was ob-
tained." 
What was said in Beach v. Brown, supra, is a fortiori 
so when applied to a case wherein the plaintiff was the 
wrong doer against whom the divorce was obtained. It was 
so held in Prettyman v. Williamson, 1 Penne. (Delaware) 
224, 39 Atl. 731, [an action for alienation of affections] 
wherein the court said : 
"The divorce granted by the legislature to Mrs. 
Prettyman, * * * may be and should be con-
sidered by you in mitigation of damages, if you 
ghould think the plaintiff entitled to recover dam-
ages, because the plaintiff would not be entitled to 
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any compensation for the loss of affection, society 
. and services of his wife after she ceased to be his 
wife." 
See also Wilson v. Coulter, 51 N. Y. S. 804. 
Even if a divorce is not a complete defense to an ac-
tion of this type, it does not follow that the plaintiff may 
recover damages for loss of services, companionship, etc., 
occurring after the date of a divorce in which he is the 
guilty party, or to which he agrees, thereby voluntarily 
giving up the right to such services and companionship. 
The court should not permit plaintiff to recover the pencun-
iary value of services, companionship, etc. to which he has 
110 right. 
POINT VIII. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THE 
LIFE EXPECTANCY TABLES, INSTRUCTION 
NO. 7, FIRST TRIAL (R. 21), INSTRUCTION 
NO. 15, SECOND TRIAL (R. 128) AND IN PER-
MITTING COUNSEL TO ARGUE FROM THE 
SAME TO THE JURY. 
In both trials, the Court instructed the jury on the 
life expectancy tables. For the reasons stated in Point VII, 
supra, this was error. There are additional reasons why 
the tables were inadmissible. Even without a divorce, in-
structing the jury on the basis of mortality tables permits 
the jury to indulge a presumption based upon other pre-
sumptions. It permits the jury to presume, not only that 
the plaintiff and his wife will live the normal life span 
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but that during this entire time they will continue to have 
love and affection for one another. It permits the addi-
tional presumption that plaintiff will continue to endure 
injury for an extended period of time. In the instant case, 
the first presumption reaches beyond the reasonable in 
view of the uncontradicted evidence that plaintiff's wife 
had only recently undergone a hysterectomy for carcinoma. 
The second presumption is impossible because of the divorce 
granted December 4, 1956. 
In Johnson v. Richards, decided by the Supreme Court 
of Idaho in 1930, 50 Idaho 150, 294 Pac. 507, the court in 
an alienation of affections case clearly held that such tables 
are inadmissible. The court said: 
"Over objection of appellant, the court admitted 
in evidence the American Experience Tables of Mor-
tality (41 C. J. p. 216, note 65a) 'for the purpose 
of showing the expectancy on the life of' plaintiff's 
husband. Respondent urges that the table is applic-
able to both respondent and her husband, their ages 
being the same, and was admissible to show the num-
ber of years respondent might have expected the 
association and support of her husband, on the theory 
that, where the marital relation is once shown to 
exist, there is a presumption that it continues until 
death. 38 C. J. p. 1328, § 102. Assuming such a 
presumption applicable to a case of this character, 
it is based upon the further presumption that the 
love and affection existing between the spouses 
would likewise continue until the death of one of 
them. We question if we are permitted to indulge 
in the latter presumption; but, in any event, we are 
asked to base a presumption upon a presumption, 
which we cannot do. The gravamen of respondent's 
right to recover is founded upon the loss of her 
husband's conjugal society or consortium, 30 C. J. 
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p. 1123; Pugsley v. Smyth, 98 Or. 448, 194 P. 686; 
Boom v. Boom, 206 Iowa 70, 220 N. W. 17. Such 
loss may or may not be permanent, according as the 
parties interested may subsequently determine. The 
same reasoning applies to the loss of support. Re-
spondent was deprived of something that is of its 
nature not necessarily permanent; and mortality 
tables, 'at the best uncertain and conjectural evi-
dence.' (Kahn v. Herold [C. C.] 147 F. 575, 582), 
could not aid the jury in assessing respondent's dam-
ages. See 3 Nichols on Applied Evidence, p. 3123. 
The expectation of life of respondent or her husband 
was not relevant under the facts of the instant case, 
and the admission of the tables was error." 
Counsel for plaintiff, relying on the Court's instruc-
tions relative to mortality tables placed on the blackboard, 
during his argument to the jury, the life expectancy of 
plaintiff and Mrs. Shaw computed not only in years but 
in days, to wit, 10,300 days. He then placed on the board 
a computation of damages based on $10.00 per day, $8.00 
per day and $5.00 per day, together with a per diem offset 
for support. This was excepted to by counsel for defendant 
(R. 713, 714). 
We believe there is a recent trend which strongly con-
demns this type of argument. The following cases so hold: 
Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 Atl. 2d 713, Ahlstrom\'. 
Minneapolis St. Paul & Sault Ste. M. R. Co., 244 Minn. 1, 
·68 N. W. 2d 873, Gardner v. State Taxi, 142 N. E. 2d 586 
(Sup. Jud. Ct. 1957), Union Pacific R. Co v. Field., 137 
Fed. 14 (8 Cir. 1905), Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Carroll, 84 
Fed. 772 ( 5 Cir. 1898), St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Farr, 
56 Fed. 994 ( 8 Cir. 1893) . An excellent expression of the 
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position here urged is found in Braddock v. Seaboard Air 
Line Railroad Co., 80 So. 2d 662 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1955). In 
the Ahlstrom case, supra, plaintiff's counsel did about what 
counsel for plaintiff did in the instant case. The court said : 
"'An award for pain, suffering, and disability 
on a per diem basis ignores the subjective basis of 
such damages. * * * Each day of suffering is 
a part of a whole and will vary and generally de-
crease as time goes on. To permit a per diem eval-
uation of pain, suffering, and disability would plunge 
the a-lready subjective determination into absurdity 
by demanding accurate mathematical computation 
of the present worth of an amount reached by guess-
work. (Emphasis added.) Certainly no amount of 
money per day could compensate a person reduced 
to plaintiff's position, and to attempt such evalua-
tion, as in this case, leads only to monstrous verdicts. 
(Emphasis added.) 
POINT IX. 
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ER-
ROR IN THE SECOND TRIAL IN ALLOWING 
AN OFF13ET OF $17,000.00 AGAINST ONLY 
THE ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS JUDG-
MENT. 
Preliminary to this discussion, we are impelled to 
suggest that the whole question of damages in an action 
for criminal conversation reveals the absurdity of the 
action, especially when it is coupled with an action for 
alienation of affections. Independently of the effect it may 
have of causing loss of affections, what is the damage sus-
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tained by a husband in an action for criminal conversation? 
Aside from the archaic basis in the common law property 
right which created the action, how is a husband pecuniarily 
damaged? What actually happens in these cases is that the 
jury is looking to the punishment of the defendant and not 
to compensating the plaintiff. This is not necessarily so 
in alienation of affections cases. 
Be this as it may, the Court in both trials instructed 
the jury that they could compensate plaintiff for defen-
dant's acts of criminal conversation for "* * * any 
and all damage he did sustain as a result thereof * * * ." 
Instruction No. 12 (R. 126). In Instruction No. 13 the 
Court amplified Instruction No. 12 by saying: "You are 
instructed that one who has lost the love and affection of 
his wife because of intentional conduct on the part of an-
other man is entitled to recover such a sum of money as 
will fairly and reasonably compensate him for any loss of 
the companionship, aid, society and services of his wife, 
which he has suffered and is reasonably certain to suffer 
in the future as a proximate result of the conduct of the 
other person." 
The jury in the second trial returned a verdict of 
$2,500.00 for alienation of affections, and $25,000.00 for 
criminal conversation, and further found that $17,000.00 
would have been contributed by the plaintiff to his wife's l 
support had she never met defendant (R. 133) . This, of 
course, was intended by the jury as an offset. The court 
allowed this offset only against the $2,500.00 returned on 
the alienation of affections action on the theory that the 
value of the duty to support could be offset only against 
J 
1 
I 
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the award for alienation of affections. The court reasoned 
that the value of the duty to support could be offset only 
against the value of lost services, and that, loss of services 
was, by the instructions, an element of damages in the cause 
of action for alienation of affections, but not an element of 
damages in the case of criminal conversation. 
There are two fallacies to the trial court's reasoning. 
First, the authorities recognize that loss of the value of 
services, less the value of the duty to support, is an element 
of a cause of action for criminal conversation. Rash v. 
Pratt, 111 Atl. 225; Allen v. Rossi, 146 Atl. 692. This rule 
was recognized by plaintiff in plaintiff's requested instruc-
tion to the jury, No. A (R. 86). Second, the instructions 
given to the jury actually permitted recovery for loss of 
services on the criminal conversation cause of action. 
In view of the foregoing, the amount found by the 
jury to represent the value of the duty of support was in-
tended by the jury to and should have been offset against 
both the verdict for alienation of affections and the verdict 
for criminal conversation. 
Whatever may have been the trial court's theory, the 
jury obviously did not understand it, and we submit that 
any juror reading Instructions Nos. 12 and 13 would have 
assumed, as this jury did, that the offset in the amount of 
$17,000.00 would be allowed in determining the net verdict. 
It is little comfort to the defendant that the jury may have 
misunderstood the instructions. Instructions are intended 
to clarify, not confuse, and when they fail in this purpose, 
reversible error has been committed. 
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POINT X. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN PERMITTING COUNSEL FOR THE 
DEFENDANT TO READ TO THE JURORS 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FROM DEPOSI-
TIONS IN WHICH THE WITNESSES CLAIMED 
THEIR PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF INCRIM-
INATION. 
At the second trial, defendant read to the jurors from 
the deposition of the defendant and also from the deposi-
tion of Mrs. Shaw (R. 579-614) (R. 642-647). Many of 
these questions elicited answers in which the witness claimed 
the privilege guaranteed by the Federal and State Consti-
tutions and also by the statutes of the State of Utah. The 
following is typical: 
"[To Mrs. Shaw] 
"Question: When you saw Mr. Pelton again in 
Las Vegas after being up here in July of 1956, if 
you did see him after that, did you have sexual in-
tercourse with him at all? 
"Answer : I refuse to answer that question on 
the same grounds that it may tend to incriminate 
me (R. 646) ." 
Mrs. Shaw claimed her privilege at least ten times 
in three pages in the evidence read from her deposition 
by plaintiff's counsel (R. 644-646). We believe this consti-
tuted prejudicial error. Counsel had only one apparent pur-
pose in reading to the jurors the claim of privilege. He in: 
tended to and did prejudice them against the defendant. 
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In Masterson v. St. Louis Transit Company, 204 Mo. 
507, 103 S. W. 48, the Missouri Court paid its respects to 
this sort of evidence. In that case, plaintiff brought an 
action for the death of his son who was struck by a street 
car. At the trial, the street car motorman was asked if 
he had not previously refused to testify at the coroner's 
inquest on the grounds that his answers might tend to 
incriminate him. The Supreme Court of Missouri said that 
this evidence was properly excluded. The court said : 
"Plaintiffs were not entitled to have the jury in 
this case draw an inference to the prejudice of the 
defendant from the fact that the motorman, through 
caution, or timidity for his own sake, would decline 
to testify before the coroner. 
* * * * 
"vVe are now asked to declare that it is a right 
which the citizen will exercise at his peril, the peril 
of being branded with suspicion, the peril of having 
it brought up against him to impeach himself if he 
should ever assert his innocence. Such a ruling 
would be a gross impairment of the constitutional 
right; because it would burden it with a dangerous 
consequence." 
The same conclusion was reached in Barnhart v. Mar-
tin, 327 Ill. App. 551; 64 N. E. 2d 743, where an action was 
brought to recover for death resulting from an automobile 
accident. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that it was 
proper to sustain an objection to an inquiry, directed to 
defendant by plaintiff's counsel for the purpose of impeach-
ment, as to whether defendant refused to testify at the 
coroner's inquest on the grounds of the privilege against 
self incrimination. 
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The same result was reached in Fries v. Berberich, 177 
S. W. 2d 640. (No Missouri citation could be found.) 
We are aware that some courts would permit such testi-
mony in a criminal or civil case for the sole purpose of im-
peaching a witness. Thus, in a criminal case if a defendant 
took the stand and protested his innocence some courts 
would permit the prosecutor to ask him if he had not on a 
previous occasion claimed his privilege on the identical 
matter. This would go to the credibility of the witness and 
would be in the nature of impeachment. Even in such cases 
the court would not permit the prosecutor to introduce the 
testimony of a party not a defendant over whom the defen-
dant had no control for the purpose of showing that such 
party had claimed the privilege. The general rule in this 
respect is stated in 24 A. L. R. 2d 896 as follows: 
"According to the few cases in which the pre-
cise question with which this annotation is concerned 
was in issue, the general rule is that when a witness, 
other than the accused, declines to answer a ques-
tion on the ground that his answer would tend to 
incriminate him, that refusal alone cannot be made 
the basis of any inference by the jury, either fav-
orable to the prosecution or favorable to the defen-
dant." 
The editor cites the following cases in support of this 
proposition. Beach v. United States, 14 Sawy 589, 46 Fed. 
754, People v. Glass, 158 Calif. 650, 112 Pac. 281, Billeci 
v. United States, 184 F. 2d 394, Powers v. State, 75 Neb. 
226, 106 N. W. 332, State v. Harper, 33 Ore. 524, 55 Pac. 
1075. The editor then states: 
"No case has been found expressing a view 
opposite to the general rule as stated above. Con-
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sequently, despite the relative dearth of authority, 
such rule may be considered as well settled, espec-
ially since it is in accord with the general principles 
of criminal law as to the protection of the rights of 
an accused." 
In a civil case it could be urged that where a defendant 
takes a stand and protests his innocence, the cross exam-
iner could ask him if he had not on a prior occasion claimed 
his privilege. This is not what occurred in the instant case. 
Here plaintiff took the deposition of defendant placing him 
in the position where on the advice of counsel he claimed 
his privilege. At a subsequent time this testimony was read, 
not for the purpose of impeachment and not for the purpose 
of proving or disproving a fact but ostensibly and obviously 
for the purpose of prejudicing the jurors. 
The only possible justification for reading the ques-
tions and answers eliciting the claim of privilege would 
be if the fact of claiming the privilige constituted substan-
tive evidence of the guilt of the witness. We know of no 
court that has gone so far. The most that has been said 
is that such evidence is admissible for the purpose of im-
peachment. 
Nor do we question the right of counsel to question a 
witness on the witness stand about matters which may re-
sult in a claim of privilege. It is quite another matter to 
read from a deposition the question and answer in which 
the privilege has been claimed and where the answer does 
not impeach. 
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POINT XI. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFEN-
DANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NOS. 
24, 25 AND 26. 
As stated in Point X supra, we believe that the depo-
sition testimony of the defendant and the witness, Dorothy 
Shaw, former wife of plaintiff, wherein each claimed the 
privilege against self incrimination was inadmissible and 
reading the same to the jurors constituted reversible error. 
Defendant attempted to offset the effect of this error by 
the Requested Instructions Nos. 24, 25 and 26 which would 
have advised the jurors that no inference can be drawn 
from such refusal to answer. For the reasons stated in 
Point X, we believe failure to give these instructions con-
stituted reversible error. 
POINT XII. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFEN-
DANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 20. 
In Instruction No. 20 defendant requested that the 
jury be instructed that they could consider the evidence that 
plaintiff's "wife" had gone out with other men in mitigation 
of damages. The court erroneously noted in refusing this 
instruction, that it was given in substance. 
We have carefully examined all the court's instructions 
and are unable to detect any indication that this matter 
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was referred to or even slightly touched upon. In fact the 
court's instruction as given eliminated this consideration. 
In Instruction No. 11, the court said: 
* * * * 
"* * * Even though there may be difficul-
ties between a husband and wife and there may be 
unhappiness, the law recognizes that there is always 
a chance that such difficulties or unhappiness may 
be overcome or eliminated, and for that reason the 
law prohibits a third person from intentionally do-
ing any act or engaging in any conduct that tends 
to interfere with, lessen, or destroy the chance that 
exists to overcome or eliminate any such difficul-
ties or unhappiness. * * *" 
The prevailing view is. that, although previous conduct 
on the part of a spouse may not constitute a defense to an 
action of this type, it should be considered in mitigating 
damages. 
Smith v. Hockenberry, 138 Mich. 129; 101 N. 
w. 207. 
Frank v. Berry, 128 Iowa 223, 103 N. W. 358. 
Allen v. Rossi, supra. 
Matusak v. Kukzewski, 295 Pa. 208, 145 Atl. 94. 
The evidence in this case is undisputed that plaintiff's 
wife had been out with other men. This was the testimony 
of plaintiff's daughter, Roxanne, as well as the sister of 
Mrs. Shaw. This evidence and the mitigating effect 
thereof was a vital part of defendant's defense, yet nowhere 
in the instructions was the jury charged that this evidence 
could be considered in mitigating damages. 
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It is of course well settled that a party is entitled to 
have his theory of the case presented to the jury. 
Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 Pac. (2d) 
772. 
POINT XIII. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 12. 
This instruction permits the jury to award damages 
for mental anguish and distress, past, present and future. 
Appellant submits that there is no competent evidence to 
support this element of damages. In no event should this 
element of damages have been considered by the jury after 
the date upon which plaintiff's former wife was awarded a 
decree of divorce. 
POINT XIV. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 13. 
This instruction permits recovery for loss of compan-
ionship, aid, society, services and other elements of dam-
ages therein set forth. 
No evidence was offered or received with respect to 
the value, if any, of the services, aid and society of plain-
tiff's former wife. In permitting the jury to award dam-
ages for these elements, the Court permitted the jury to 
speculate without any limitation or guide with respect 
thereto. One can search the record without finding any 
substantial or concrete evidence upon which to make a 
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determination as to damages for lost aid, society and ser-
vices. 
This instruction also permitted the jury to consider 
the services which the wife had rendered in the rearing 
of the children in the home and the assistance the wife had 
given in the management of plaintiff's business. Plaintiff, 
obviously, sustained no damage relating to the rearing of 
the said children, inasmuch as his said wife was awarded 
custody of the said children and has continued to rear the 
children. There is no evidence that the plaintiff's said wife 
had rendered any assistance in the management of plain-
tiff's business for a number of years, nor that there was 
any intention or contemplation that she would render such 
assistance in the future. To permit the jury to consider 
the services of the wife in rearing the children and assist-
ance in the management of the business was to give it a 
roving commission by which it could further magnify the 
damages, without any real or substantial evidence or basis 
therefor. 
POINT XV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL ON THE GROUNDS 
THAT THE VERDICT WAS GROSSLY EX-
CESSIVE AND UNWARRANTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE. 
That the verdict in this case was grossly excessive and 
unwarranted by the evidence, both as to compensatory and 
punitive damages, is so apparent as to require only brief 
consideration herein. 
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The evidence was considered by the trial court in the 
first trial and determined not to warrant a judgment in 
favor of plaintiff in excess of $5,000 compensatory dam~ 
ages. Judge Stewart M. Hanson ordered a remission of th( 
verdict to $5,000 compensatory damages or a new trial. 
There was little difference in the evidence presented on 
the second trial, and no material difference in the evidence 
relating to the issue of damages. 
Appellant is aware that the court must read and con-
sider the entire transcript in determining whether there i~ 
merit to this point. It would serve no useful purpose for 
appellant to set out the evidence relating to damages. It 
is sufficient to say that a careful consideration of the en-
tire record will compel the conclusion that the evidence 
does not justify nor support the judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment should 
be reversed and the actions dismissed. In the event that 
the Court determines that the actions should not be dis-
missed, the judgment should be reversed and the action 
remanded for new trial, in accordance with the opinion 
of the Court prescribing the rules which apply to the many 
questions of first impression involved herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
Clifford L. Ashton, 
Leonard J. Lewis, 
Counsel for Appellant. 
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